President Trump on April 2, 2026, signed an executive order titled “Adjusting Imports of Pharmaceuticals and Pharmaceutical Ingredients Into the United States,” imposing tariffs of up to 100% on patented drug imports from 17 major pharmaceutical companies that maintain patent-protected U.S. market positions while manufacturing abroad. The order introduces a 120-day implementation period and represents an unprecedented policy linkage between intellectual property exclusivity and domestic manufacturing obligations.
The named companies include AbbVie, Bristol Myers Squibb, Gilead Sciences, Novartis, Novo Nordisk, and twelve others. These companies hold U.S. patents on branded pharmaceuticals sold at premium prices in the American market while relying on manufacturing facilities located outside the United States. Under the executive order, companies that commit to U.S.-based manufacturing within the 120-day window will face a reduced tariff rate of 20% rather than the maximum 100%. However, this preferential rate is conditioned on an additional requirement: within four years, companies must also agree to Most-Favored-Nation pricing—aligning their U.S. consumer prices with the lowest prices they charge in comparable markets globally—or the tariff escalates to the full 100% level.
From an intellectual property law standpoint, the executive order constitutes the most direct federal policy intervention to date linking patent exclusivity to manufacturing location. U.S. patent law imposes no domestic manufacturing requirement on patentees. A U.S. patent holder may assert infringement against importers of products made abroad, including under 35 U.S.C. § 271(g) for products made by patented processes. The executive order does not amend the Patent Act; it operates as a trade policy measure. The practical effect, however, is to condition the commercial benefits of patent exclusivity—market access without competitive tariff burdens—on establishing U.S. manufacturing operations.
The pharmaceutical industry is likely to challenge the order on multiple grounds. The World Trade Organization’s Agreement on Trade-Related Aspects of Intellectual Property Rights (TRIPS Agreement) obligates member states to grant patents and permit patent holders to exercise exclusive rights regardless of manufacturing location. Whether imposing import tariffs specifically on patented products whose holders manufacture abroad constitutes a TRIPS-inconsistent measure—particularly under Articles 27, 28, and 30—will be a central legal question for trade and IP counsel. The order’s reliance on domestic national security or unfair trade practice authority (such as Section 232 or Section 301 of U.S. trade law) may provide a legal basis, but its consistency with multilateral obligations is not established.
For IP practitioners, the order raises the question of whether U.S. patent prosecution strategy must now incorporate manufacturing location planning at the portfolio level. Multinational pharmaceutical companies with patents filed in the United States but with manufacturing in Ireland, Singapore, Switzerland, or India will need to assess whether their exposure to the 100% tariff is commercially manageable or whether accelerated U.S. manufacturing investment is warranted. The four-year MFN pricing condition further complicates the calculus, as aligning U.S. prices with international reference prices would significantly reduce revenues from the U.S. market—historically the world’s most profitable for branded pharmaceuticals.
The order also intersects with the biosimilars and generic drug landscape. If branded pharmaceutical companies relocate manufacturing to the United States to obtain the reduced tariff rate, the cost structure of domestic pharmaceutical manufacturing may shift in ways that affect biosimilar entry economics. Similarly, the API (active pharmaceutical ingredient) supply chain—much of which is concentrated in China and India—could be affected if the order’s scope is interpreted to cover upstream ingredients as well as finished pharmaceutical products.
The 120-day window expires in late July 2026. In the interim, affected companies are expected to announce manufacturing restructuring plans, initiate trade litigation, or engage in negotiations with the administration. The broader precedent this order sets—effectively conditioning patent-derived market access on domestic industrial policy compliance—may prove as consequential for global IP and trade law as the tariff rates themselves.
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